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Abstrat
Unemployment varies a lot aross spae and time. Can attitudes towards work explain
some of these dierenes? We study job searh durations along the Swiss language bor-
der, whih is geographially very sharp and divides German-speaking from "Latin"-speaking
regions. Despite similar loal labor markets and idential institutions, job seekers on the
"Latin"-speaking side need about seven weeks longer (or 20 perent) to nd a new job. To
understand the role of work attitudes and worker sorting aross regions, we set up a job
searh model with ostly regional mobility. Our model predits (i) longer unemployment
durations and (ii) higher mobility in the region with less strong work attitudes. We provide
empirial evidene in line with these preditions. Our most onservative estimates suggest
that dierenes in work attitudes generate dierenes in unemployment durations that are
as important as large hanges in unemployment benets.
JEL lassiation: J21, J64, Z10
Keywords: ulture, preferenes, values, norms, unemployment duration, regional unemploy-
ment.
∗
This is a substantially modied version of the paper "Does Culture Aet Unemployment? Evidene from the
Röstigraben" (IZA DP 4283). We are grateful to Rihard Berthoud, David Card, Pierre Cahu, Christian Dust-
mann, Andrea Ihino, Steve Jenkins, Franis Kramarz, Mihael Lehner, Guy Mihaels, Jean-Baptiste Mihau,
Javier Ortega, Barbara Petrongolo, Steve Pudney, Steve Pishke, Analia Shlosser, Arthur von Soest, Mathias
Thoenig, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Fabrizio Zilibotti and seminar partiipants at Athens, Berkeley, Bern, Champex,
Engelberg, Essex, Harvard, Houston, IZA, LSE, PSE, Tel Aviv, UCL, and Zurih for helpful omments. Andreas
Steinhauer provided exellent researh assistane. Rafael Lalive aknowledges funding from the Swiss National
Siene Foundation (Grant No. 100012-120356/1) and the Swiss National Center for Competene in Researh
LIVES. Rafael Lalive also thanks the Center for Labor Eonomis at UC Berkeley for its hospitality during a
major revision of this paper. We would also like to thank Jonathan Gast at the Swiss State Seretariat for
Eonomi Aairs for help onerning the data and information on institutional details, and Thomas Bruederli at
searh.h for distane data. Addresses: Beatrix Eugster, University of St. Gallen, CDI-HSG, Rosenbergstrasse
51, CH-9000 St. Gallen, beatrix.eugsterunisg.h. Rafael Lalive, University of Lausanne, Faulty of Business and
Eonomis, CH-1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, rafael.laliveunil.h. Rafael Lalive is also aliated with CESifo, and
IFAU. Josef Zweimüller, University of Zurih, Department of Eonomis, Mühlebahstrasse 86, CH-8008 Zürih,
zweimiew.uzh.h. Josef Zweimüller is also aliated with CESifo.
1 Introdution
Unemployment varies a lot over time and aross spae in ways that are not explained by laws
or markets. OECD (2005) douments strong dierenes in unemployment aross ountries even
when dierenes in institutions have been aounted for. Similarly, dierent regions within
the same ountry often experiene large dierenes in unemployment despite faing the same
institutions. The view that unemployment only follows inentives and markets is probably too
narrow.
Soial sientists and some evolutionary biologists argue that ulture  the set of beliefs,
norms, and preferenes shared aross soial groups  is an important determinant of behavior.
De Toqueville et al. (1966) was fasinated by the dierenes between the United States of
Ameria and Frane and Britain in terms of the ore values that shape the ways demoraies
work. More reently, Boyd and Riherson (1985) disuss the proess of ultural evolution. Also
eonomists have argued that ulture might aet employment (Akerlof, 1980; Lindbek and
Nyberg, 2006). Yet little is known whether suh ultural dierenes are quantitatively important
for explaining unemployment. This is due to a key empirial hallenge. Culture often o-evolves
with laws and institutions (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Hene isolating the diret eets of
ulture from its indiret eets via laws and institutions is hallenging.
This paper studies the eet of ulture on unemployment by omparing job searh behavior
aross language regions in Switzerland. Swiss language areas are assoiated with spei ultural
traits. Language areas are divided by a sharp geographial border: the Roesti border. The
Roesti border  referring to a popular German-Swiss way of preparing potatoes, Roesti  has
beome a metaphor for the general ultural divide within the ountry. The diret-demorati
politial system of Switzerland repeatedly reveals strong dierenes in politial attitudes and
preferenes in national referenda. These dierenes are partiularly striking in votes relating to
work-time regulations: Frenh or Italian (Latin)-speakers are onsistently more supportive in
votes demanding less weekly working hours, longer vaations, or less restritive early retirement
rules. Dierenes in values and work preferenes beome also very lear from survey data. In
a 1997 survey, 78 % of people living in the German-speaking part of Switzerland state that "I
would work even if I did not need the money", yet only 50 % of Frenh or Italian speaking survey
respondents agree with this statement.
To understand how ulture might aet unemployment, our empirial analysis studies dif-
ferenes in unemployment durations at the Roesti border. Two features of this border are of
partiular interest in the present ontext: First, the dominant language spoken in a muniipality
hanges sharply at the Roesti border. Within a geographial distane of 5 kilometers, the fra-
tion of Latin native speakers falls from more than 80 perent to less than 20 perent (and vie
versa, for German native speakers). Seond, important segments of the language border do not
oinide with antonal (state) borders. Therefore, the language-border onstrast within antons
holds laws and institutions onstant, while exploiting dierenes in ulture. The Roesti border
represents an empirial design that addresses a key empirial hallenge in studying the role of
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ulture.
Our empirial analysis uses data overing the universe of individuals entering unemployment
over the period 1998-2003 in Switzerland. We fous on Swiss men in the age group 25-60
living within 50 kilometers of the language border. This provides us with more than 60,000
unemployment spells. A nie feature of this data set is that is provides information on how a
new job was found: (i) through one's own initiative or (ii) through plaement via the loal labor
oe. This information is helpful for understanding the relative importane of individual searh
eort as a determinant of observed unemployment dierenes at the language border.
Our desriptive analysis of the Roesti border highlights three interesting ndings. First, there
is a robust dierene in unemployment durations at the language border. Individuals living in
Latin-speaking border ommunities leave unemployment seven weeks later than individuals living
in German-speaking ommunities. This amounts to a 20-perent gap in the average duration of
unemployment. Seond, attitudes towards work hange sharply at the Roesti border. Support for
work-time regulations in national referenda is onsistently higher among residents on the Latin-
speaking side. Dierenes in voting outomes are often strikingly large, not only on average,
but also at the language border, indiating a strong disontinuity in work norms, values and
preferenes at the Roesti border. This is further supported by survey evidene suggesting that
Latin-speaking individuals are muh less likely to think that hard work leads to suess, and muh
more likely to think that external fores shape what happens in your life. Third, dierenes
in (i) work-fore omposition (and muniipality harateristis), (ii) labor markets, and (iii)
labor market poliies annot aount for the gap in unemployment durations. While there
are ompositional hanges at the border, the imbalanes are small and ontrolling for them
tends to amplify the gap in unemployment durations. Labor markets are very similar at the
language border: Firms in Latin-speaking ommunities are equally likely as rms in German-
speaking ones to employ a worker from the other language region; and the vaany-employment
ratio is slightly higher on the Latin-speaking side, indiating slightly better hanes to nd job
there. With respet to ative labor market poliies, there are dierenes in the way regional
employment oes implement these poliies, but these dierenes are too small to aount for
the unemployment gap. We onlude that omposition, markets, and poliies do not provide
rst-order explanations for observed dierenes in unemployment durations at the Roesti border.
While observable harateristis do not explain observed outomes, the results may still
be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. To understand the potential eets of worker sorting,
we present a job-searh model with ostly regional mobility and heterogenous types. Regional
dierenes are aptured by dierenes in the distribution of types (whih dier aording to
their searh-eieny) and by a (xed) psyhi ost of unemployment. The model generates two
testable preditions. First, individuals born into the region L  the region with (on average)
less eient job searhers and the lower psyhi ost of unemployment  are more likely to move
to the other region G than individuals born into region G (high-psyhi ost region with more
eient job searhers). Seond, individuals born into region G (L) who stay in region G (L)
have shorter (longer) unemployment durations than those who move to region L (G).
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To shed light on these empirial preditions, we exploit information on workers' region of
residene (= region of job searh), region of birth (= workers' native language), and workers'
mobility behavior. Consistent with the preditions of the model, we nd that workers living
(and searhing) on the Latin-speaking side of the language border are signiantly more mobile
than workers living (and searhing) on the German-speaking side of the border. Moreover,
unemployment durations both by German-speaking and Latin-speaking workers are signiantly
higher when they live (and searh) on the Latin-speaking side of the border. While dierenes
in harateristis, markets, or poliies at the language border are too small to aount for these
outomes, they are perfetly onsistent with an explanation based on dierenes in ulture.
This paper is related to a rapidly expanding literature on the role of ulture in various labor
market outomes. Alesina et al. (2006) investigate why Amerians work so muh more than
Europeans. They argue that European labor market regulations inuened leisure patterns and
reated a "leisure ulture" through a soial multiplier (the returns to leisure are higher when
more people take longer vaations). A model based on suh omplementarities in leisure performs
better in explaining US-European dierenes in working hours than a model based on dierenes
in taxation (Presott, 2004). Fernández and Fogli (2006) and Fernández and Fogli (2009) nd
that the ountry of heritage signiantly aets the work (and fertility) behavior of married
seond-generation immigrant women. This is onsistent with the hypothesis that the ulture of
the ountry of origin aets urrent eonomi outomes. Fernández (2007) shows that attitudes
in the ountry of anestry towards women's market work and housework have explanatory power
for urrent labor market partiipation. Algan and Cahu (2007) and Alesina and Giuliano (2010)
investigate the partiular role of family ulture in labor market outomes. These studies nd
that strong family ties redue labor fore partiipation. Ihino and Maggi (2000) study ultural
dierenes in the propensity to shirk (absenteeism and misondut) using data from a large Italian
bank. A further related strand of the literature has foused on the emergene of and support
for labor market institutions suh as the unemployment insurane system. Algan and Cahu
(2009) argue that ultural dierenes an explain why some ountries implement dierent mixes
of employment protetion and unemployment insurane. Lindbek et al. (2003) and Lindbek
and Nyberg (2006) onsider the dynamis of work ethis and how these dynamis interat with
the evolution of welfare state provisions.
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This paper ontributes to the literature in at least three respets. First, it uses an interesting
and novel empirial design to provide evidene on the role of ulture for unemployment outomes.
1
Three further strands of the literature are related. First, a theoretial strand onsiders the transmission of
ultural values from parents to hildren. See, for example, Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), and Bisin et al. (2004)
on marriage and religion, Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) on orruption, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) on lass-spei
preferenes and the industrial revolution. Seond, other studies have looked at the role of ulture in explaining
the demand for redistribution (Alesina and Fuhs-Shundeln, 2007), eonomi performane (Tabellini, 2010), or
trade (Guiso et al., 2009), and horizontal spillovers in unemployment outomes (Clark, 2003; Stutzer and Lalive,
2004; Kolm, 2005). (Eugster et al., 2011) also show that there is a sizeable gap in demand for redistribution at
the language border between regions of Switzerland. Eugster and Parhet (2014) study tax setting in the Roesti
border ontext. The third strand argues that eonomi institutions may shape important elements of a group's
ulture. See Maystre et al. (2014) for a reent study of the eet of trade on ultural diversity and Bowles (1998)
for a survey on the eets of markets on preferenes.
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Limiting the empirial analysis to a narrowly dened geographi area helps separating the ultural
omponent of unemployment from other relevant explanations for dierenes in unemployment.
Seond, this setting allows us to go beyond the existing state-of-the-art approah that relies
on studying seond or third generation immigrants in a similar ontext. This epidemiologial
approah to studying ulture an get at the individual omponents of ulture (beliefs, values)
but misses out on the soial aspet of ulture (soial norms, et.). The language border ontrast
allows seeing both elements. Third, we explore the sorting by heterogenous workers aross
ulturally dierent regions in a simple theoretial framework. The model generates dierenes
in job searh and mobility behavior onsistent with empirial evidene.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Setion 2 provides the bakground both on languages
spoken in Switzerland and the institutions and poliies shaping labor markets. Setion 3 disusses
the main datasets used in our empirial analysis. Setion 4 provides a desriptive analysis of job
searh, ulture, and other determinants of job searh at the Roesti border. Setion 5 develops
the model, and setion 6 presents our empirial strategy. Setion 7 presents our main results,
in partiular how unemployment duration and job mobility are driven by ulture and other
ompeting explanations. Setion 8 onludes.
2 Bakground
This setion disusses language regions and poliies aeting unemployment in Switzerland.
2.1 Languages
Switzerland has four oial languages. German is spoken by 63.7 perent of the population,
Frenh by 20.4 perent, Italian by 6.5 perent, and Romansh by 0.5 perent (Lüdi et al., 2005).
Three antons  Valais, Fribourg, and Berne  are bilingual (Frenh, German); one anton 
Graubuenden  is oially trilingual (German, Romansh, Italian). The remaining antons are
unilingual, with seventeen German-speaking and four Frenh-speaking. Multilingual antons
exist for historial reasons. The border of the anton Valais traes the anient border of the
Roman-atholi dioese of Sion. The border of the antons Fribourg and Berne trae the ter-
ritories aquired by their apitals in the Middle Ages. The border of the anton Graubuenden
traes the borders of the anient Roman provine of Rhaetia.
In what follows, we group the various regions of the ountry into two main language areas,
German-speaking and Latin-speaking (Frenh, Italian, Romansh). We disuss below that these
two broad regions feature quite strong dierenes in norms and values, inluding preferenes
for and attitudes towards work. Figure 1 displays a map of Switzerland where eah of the
roughly 2,600 Swiss muniipalities is shaded aording to the language spoken by a majority
of its residents as in the 2000 ensus. Light-shaded areas indiate a majority of German native
speakers in the muniipality. Dark-shaded areas indiate a majority of native speakers of Frenh,
Italian, or Romansh. Dark lines separate the 26 Swiss antons. For our analysis it will be ruial
that important parts of the language border are within (bilingual) antons. This implies that
4
Figure 1: Language regions in Switzerland
Notes: Dark-shaded areas indiate a majority of Latin-speakers (Frenh in the
West, Italian in the South and Romansh in the East). Light-shaded areas indiate
a majority of German-speaker. Dark (white) lines indiate anton (muniipality)
borders. Soure: Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO), Neuhâtel.
many individuals are exposed to the same poliies and institutions, but live in dierent language
areas and are exposed to dierent ultures. We also note that, for the most part, the language
border is not a geographial barrier. The largest segment of the language border runs from North
to South while the main geographial barrier, the Alps, is in East-West diretion.
Figure 2 shows the perentage of Latin-speaking Swiss residents by distane to the language
border. We dene distane to the border as the driving distane in kilometers to get from a
muniipality to the language border. Distane is dened as zero for muniipalities loated exatly
on the Latin-speaking side of the language border (whose nearest neighboring muniipality is
German speaking). To reet both distane and language region, we ode the distane measure
negatively for muniipalities in the German-speaking region and positively for the Latin-speaking
region. The gure learly demonstrates that the Roesti border is a sharp language barrier. At
the border, there is a sharp jump from about 22 perent Latin-speakers on the German language
area to more than 85 perent on the Latin-dominated side, a hange whih ours within a
distane of 5 (!) km. We onlude that the language border delineates the two regions very
sharply.
Even though Switzerland is a multilingual ountry, eduation poliy aims to enhane inte-
gration. Children learn to speak one of the other oial languages as their rst foreign language
latest from grade 5 or 6 onwards. Children in the German-speaking region learn Frenh as their
rst foreign language, while hildren in the Frenh-speaking region learn German as their rst
foreign language. Children in the Italian region hoose between Frenh or German. This trans-
lates into good ommand of the languages spoken in other parts of the ountry. Around 73
perent of Swiss residents of the Frenh speaking region of Switzerland and 92 perent of Swiss
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Figure 2: Perentage Latin-speakers (Frenh, Italian or Romansh), by distane to
language border
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=Frenh-/Italian-
speaking part. Soure: Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe
(FSO), Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
residents in the German speaking regions speak a seond language of the ountry (Werlen et al.,
2011).
2.2 Poliies
The ruling onstitution gives antons onsiderable disretion in politial deision making (i.e. in
taxation, eduation, et.) leading to a situation where legal rules dier strongly aross antons.
However, this is not the ase for labor legislation in general and unemployment insurane in
partiular. These poliies are determined at the federal level. Unemployment benet rules are
relatively generous. Maximum benet duration is 2 years, and the marginal replaement rate is
70 perent or 80 perent of previous earnings, depending on the presene of dependent family
members and previous inome. Job seekers are entitled to benets if they had paid unemployment
insurane ontributions for at least six months in the two years prior to registering at the publi
employment servie (PES) and if they are able to work.
2
Entitlement riteria to unemployment
benets also inlude ompliane with job-searh requirements and partiipation in ative labor
market programs. Potential job oers stem from the publi vaany information system of the
PES, private temporary help rms, or the job seeker's own pool of potential jobs. Non-ompliane
with any of these obligations is santioned by omplete withdrawal of benets for a period that
an last up to 30 work days (see Lalive et al. 2005 for details on the Swiss santion system).
2
A 2003 reform redued maximum benet duration to 1.5 years for job seekers who are younger than 55 years,
or job seekers who had ontributed less than 12 out of the previous 24 months. Maximum benet duration was
kept unhanged for job seekers who had ontributed to unemployment insurane for 12 months and were older
than 55 years.
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This means that dierenes in benet duration and level annot explain dierenes in regional
unemployment. However, sine regions have an important role in implementing ounseling and
monitoring praties, these an potentially ontribute to regional dierenes in unemployment
(Lalive et al., 2005; Gern and Lehner, 2002; Frölih and Lehner, 2004).
Eduation poliy is important in shaping labor supply beause it determines the level of skill
of the work fore. While shool systems and shool urriula vary onsiderably aross antons,
they are homogeneous within antons. Muniipalities have to adopt the antonal urriulum, they
have however signiant sope of ation in the hiring of teahers as well as in the infrastruture
provided. Beause muniipalities are also responsible for the naning of primary shools, the
shool quality is likely to depend on muniipal budget, whih is determined by the level of taxation
and the distribution of inomes. Muniipal inome and wealth tax rates are also likely to inuene
labor supply diretly. First, they inuene the net wage reeived from work. Seond, they are a
key parameter of residential loation for both individuals and rms. Eugster and Parhet (2014)
show signiant dierenes in tax rates aross language regions, but no disontinuity in tax rates
and muniipal inome distribution at the language border.
3 Data
Our main data soure are unemployment register data from the years 1998-2003, olleted by the
loal publi employment servies. A job seeker is inluded in this data as soon as she les a laim
for unemployment benets, and the ase worker enters this laim into the so-alled AVAM/ASAL
system of the ministry of labor. This system registers the date the laim starts as well as a wealth
of information on the individual. Job seekers then see the aseworker on a regular basis and any
new information is updated in the system. A job seeker leaves the database either when she
nds a new job or for "unknown reasons" (does not show up any more; has moved to a dierent
region; or has exhausted unemployment benets).
Our unemployment inow analysis is based on Swiss men aged 25-60. We exlude women
beause both dierenes in work ulture and family ulture may aet female labor supply
(Steinhauer, 2013). The lower age bound ensures that an unemployed worker in our sample
has (mostly) nished eduation. The upper bound exludes unemployment spells that ow
diretly into early retirement. We also restrit attention to people who are registered as full-time
unemployed and who are entitled to unemployment benets. This seletion does not ritially
lower the number of unemployment spells but ensures a homogeneous sample. We limit the data
to individuals living within a 50 km distane to the language border.
The data ontain information on job seekers' soio-eonomi bakground as well as informa-
tion on the muniipality of residene. We supplement these data with information on the soio-
demographi struture of the muniipality of residene, labor demand variables, and variables
desribing loal labor market poliies. Individual ontrols inlude soio-eonomi harateristis
as reported in the AVAM/ASAL data base as well as information on previous employment: age,
marital status, number of dependent family members, willingness to ommute or move, edua-
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tion, qualiation, the setor of previous employment (agriulture, manufaturing, onstrution,
servies, tourism, other), previous insured earnings, and the assessment of the aseworker w.r.t.
the ease of nding a suitable job. Muniipality ontrols are taken from the Swiss population
ensus 2000 and inlude the struture of population/employment by 5-year age groups, ve ed-
uation groups, and three setors as well as the perentage of men and immigrants living in the
respetive muniipality, the total number of inhabitants, and whether the muniipality belongs
to an agglomeration area or not. Labor demand ontrols are measured at the muniipality level
and inlude the number of vaanies posted from January to June 2000 per employed resident in
the working age population, the 1998 number of jobs, the 1998-2001 hanges in both the number
of jobs and the number of rms, and the median wage of eah muniipality. This information is
based on the Swiss rm ensuses 1998 and 2001 and on the Swiss Labor Fore Surveys 19912008.
4 The Roesti border: unemployment and ultural dierenes
We proeed by providing rst desriptive evidene on dierenes in unemployment durations at
the Roesti border. We then show that the Roesti border is a ultural border that is partiularly
striking with respet to norms, values and attitudes towards work (and work regualtions). We
also disuss whether the Roesti border is assoiated with a hange in other dimensions that
are potentially important in explaining unemployment durations, suh as the harateristis of
residents (and muniipalities), indiators of labor markets, and the implementation of labor
market poliies.
4.1 Unemployment durations
Let us take a rst look on how average durations of unemployment hange at the language border.
Figure 3 plots average weeks of unemployment experiened by residents loated at dierent
distanes from this border. Just like before, positive (negative) distanes indiate loations on
the Latin- (German-) speaking side. The Figure reveals a very lear disontinuity in average
unemployment durations at the language border. This dierene is quantitatively large: the
average duration of unemployment on the German-speaking side is about 28 weeks and the
orresponding value on the Latin-speaking side is about 34 weeks. Note that all data points
displayed on the Latin-speaking side are above the highest data point on the German-speaking
side. Moreover, there is no strong trend by distane from the border in the German-speaking
regions, but durations inrease with distane to border on the Latin-speaking side.
Figure 3 provides some rst desriptive evidene that Latin-side residents of the Roesti border
take muh longer to leave unemployment than German-side residents of the border. There are
at least two dierent explanations for this nding. One explanation holds that this dierential is
due to dierent work attitudes among Latin-speaking ompared to German-speaking job seekers.
Alternatively, this dierene ould be due to dierent omposition of the job seeker pool or
dierenes in labor demand. We investigate the relevane of these alternative explanations
below.
8
Figure 3: Average durations of unemployment, by distane to language border
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=Frenh-/Italian-
speaking part. Points show 10km averages in unemployment dura-
tion. Lines are loally weighted regression estimates (bandwidth = 0.8).
Soure: Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Federal Statistial Oe
(FSO), Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
4.2 The Roesti border as a ultural divide
The Roesti border is not merely a language border, but it has beome a metaphor for the general
ultural divide within Switzerland. Interesting evidene omes from survey data (ISSP). When
asked whether one agrees to the statement "I would enjoy a paid job even if I did not need
the money", striking dierenes are revealed between language groups.
3
Table 1 shows that
German-speaking respondents indiate muh stronger support for this statement than Latin-
speaking respondents and the dierenes are substantially higher in 1997 (a reession year) than
in 2005 (a boom).
Table 1: Importane of Work aross Language Groups
Year Latin German Dierene
Enjoy a paid job even if I did not need the money
a
1997 3.26 2.60 0.65***
Enjoy a paid job even if I did not need the money
a
2005 2.58 2.26 0.32***
Notes:
a
1=strongly agree, 2="agree", 3="indierent", 4="disagree", 5="strongly disagree".
This table reports the average disagreement with the statement "I would enjoy a paid job even
if I did not need the money" by interview language. Soure: ISSP 1997 and 2005, own
alulations.
The Swiss politial system of diret demoray provides another way to extrat information on
how attitudes towards work dier aross language regions. In national referenda, the population
3
The Swiss module of the International Soial Survey Programme provides information on the importane of
work (ISSP 1997 and 2005).
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Figure 4: Voting results on six referenda, by distane to language border
a. Vaations
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d. Retirement age
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f. Women's retirement age
(2002)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 y
es
 v
ot
es
−100 −80 −60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100
distance to language border
Notes: negative distane=German-speaking part; positive distane=Frenh-/Italian-speaking part. This
gure reports perentage of yes votes in national referenda or voter initiatives on work time regulations.
Lines are loally weighted regressions (bandwidth = 0.8). Soure: data from Federal Statistial Oe
(FSO), Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
votes regularly about all kinds of issues.
4
Here we fous on referenda where voters revealed
their preferenes in votes onerning work-time regulations. Sine 1980, three referenda on laws
regulating weekly or yearly working time were held at the national level. In 1985, Swiss itizens
voted on a proposal whether to guarantee at least 4 weeks of paid vaation to everyone, and 5
weeks to anyone aged 40 years or older; in 1988 whether to redue regular weekly working time to
40 hours; and in 2002 whether to redue weekly working time to 36 hours. Moreover, there were
three referenda related to lifetime work: in 1988, the population voted on whether to redue the
statutory retirement age from 65 to 62 for men and from 62 to 60 for women; in 2000 whether to
make early retirement more attrative to all workers; and in 2000 whether to leave the statutory
retirement age for women at age 62 (rather than inreasing it to age 65).
Figure 4 uses information on voting results at the muniipality level by distane to the
language border. Panel a)-) shows the proportion favoring the working-time regulations for the
"intensive margin". These graphs tell a onsistent story: voters on the Latin-speaking side of
the language border are onsistently more in favor of work-time redutions than voters on the
German-speaking side and there is a large disontinuity at the border. The piture is very similar
4
Voter initiatives are a ruial part of the Swiss politial system. Voter initiatives are proposals to modify the
onstitution. Voters are alled to vote on an initiative one 100,000 Swiss itizens sign a doument asking that
the proposal be deided in a voter initiative. Muniipal data on voter initiatives are available in eletroni form
sine 1980.
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Table 2: Cultural Determinants of Job Searh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Question Number of
Mean answer

Coeient
observations Latin German Dierene on Latin

A. Soial and Family Networks
(1) Number of weak ties (neighbors and olleagues)
a
: SHP 1999-2008
16,486 9.553 11.638 −2.085∗∗∗ −1.768∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.167) (0.223) (0.605)
(2)
Family ties (values from 3-8, higher values mean weaker ties)
b
: WVS 1996
1,012 3.596 3.988 −0.392∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.045) (0.059) (0.067)
B. Beliefs
(1) Freedom of hoie and ontrol over the way your life turns out (values
from 1-10, higher values mean more freedom of hoie): WVS 1996
1,190 6.833 7.475 −0.642∗∗∗ −0.627∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.076) (0.116) (0.130)
(2) Suess is due to hard work (1) vs a matter of luk and onnetions (10):
WVS 1996
1,150 5.028 3.898 1.130∗∗∗ 1.131∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.105) (0.164) (0.181)
C. Religion
(1) Religion (perentage Catholis in muniipality): Swiss Census 2000
1,260 53.007 34.659 18.348∗∗∗ 10.416∗∗∗
(31.195) (30.051) (1.734) (2.864)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
Table entries are the mean response in the sale from 1 to 10 for items (4) and (5).

Estimate on Latin oeient in regression of response to survey item on age, sex,
eduation (low, medium, high) for VWS items. Separation into language regions by
ethniity, German = Swiss German, Latin = Swiss Frenh/Italian. Only data within
50km from the language border used.
a
See Eugster et. al. (2011) for details on the
onstrution of the number of weak ties.
b
See Alesina and Guiliano (2010) for details
on the onstrution of family ties. Soure: Swiss Household Panel (SHP) arried out
in 1999-2008 (individuals are surveyed repeatedly). Swiss Census arried out in 2000.
World Values Survey (WVS) arried out in 1996. Distanes from searh.h.
when we look at voting results onerning lifetime-work regulations in panels d)-f).
5
In sum,
the language border shows a lear and very onsistent gap in politial support for work-time
regulations.
Cultural dierenes may aet unemployment dierenes not only through attitudes towards
work but also via other hannels suh as the role of the family and an individual's network. By
insuring the individual better against eonomi shoks, strong ties to the family may prolong the
duration of unemployment. In ontrast, "weak ties" (aquaintanes other than lose friends and
family members) may speed up job nding, beause they provide aess to information from more
distant parts of the soial system (Granovetter, 1995). Survey data from the Swiss Household
Panel Survey and the World Value Survey suggest that Latin-speaking Swiss individuals have
fewer weak ties and stronger family ties. The data set reports how many olleagues and friends
an individual meets on a regular basis, whih we take as a proxy for an individual's weak ties.
6
Table 2 Panel A shows that German-speaking individuals have, on average, 11.6 neighbors
and olleagues (olumn 4), the orresponding number for Latin-speaking individuals is only
9.5 (olumn 3). The gap redues to 1.7 within bilingual antons (olumn 6), but it remains
5
Eugster et al. (2011) also analyse the three votes regarding the retirement age.
6
See Voorpostel et al. (2012) for a desription of the Swiss Household Panel Survey.
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signiantly dierent from zero.
7
The seond item in Panel A Table 2 looks at dierenes in the
strength of family ties among Latin- and German-speaking individuals in Switzerland using data
from the World Value Survey 1996. The indiator of the strength of family ties is based on three
items that apture the strength of family ties in the World Values Survey. We follow Alesina and
Giuliano (2010) in onstruting a omposite index by summing up the responses on this item.
The omposite indiator takes on values between 3 and 8, with 3 indiating the strongest family
ties, and 8 indiating weak family ties.
Panel B of Table 2 provides omplementary evidene for Switzerland from the World Value
Survey on values and beliefs onerning freedom of hoie, ontrol over life, and the soures of
eonomi suess. It turns out that Latin-speakers pereive that they have less freedom of hoie
and less ontrol over their lives and they believe muh less in the idea of hard work being the
main soure of eonomi suess. Taken together, the evidene suggests strong dierenes in
beliefs and values onerning issues that are of high importane for the motivation to searh
hard for a new job.
8
Panel C of Table 2 disusses the role of religion. As religion is unlikely to
hange over an individual's lifetime, reent work on the role of ulture has used religion as an
instrumental variable (Guiso et al., 2006). Aording to Max Weber, "protestant ethis"  the
pursuit of eonomi suess as a duty  a higher (lower) prevalene of individuals with Protestant
(Catholi) onfession may determine attitudes towards work and higher eorts when searhing for
a new job. The evidene in Table 2, based on data from the Swiss Census 2000, indeed indiates
a signiantly higher fration of Catholis in the muniipalities in Latin-speaking regions.
The above disussion provides a onsistent piture. Both survey evidene and evidene on
voting results support the idea of substantial dierenes in attitudes towards work between
Latin- and German-speaking individuals. Moreover, voting results strongly suggest that there is
an abrupt hange in these attitudes at the Roesti border. We onlude that the Roesti border
separates two ultures that dier substantially in ways that are potentially important to explain
unemployment durations.
4.3 Other disontinuities at the Roesti border?
The above disussion suggests that ulture hanges in a signiant way at the language border.
However, this does not neessarily mean that norms, preferenes, and attitudes towards work
drive the disontinuities in unemployment durations at the language border. There may be other
fators varying at the border, thus ontributing to the gap in unemployment durations. We rst
disuss whether there are dierenes in harateristis among workers in the unemployment pool.
Figure 5 shows that job seekers' pre-unemployment earnings do not show a disontinuity at the
language border. While earnings derease somewhat when approahing the border from the
7
The gap is even more pronouned among the unemployed. The German-speaking unemployed have 11.3
neighbors or former olleagues, while the Latin-speaking unemployed have on average have 8.3 neighbors or
former olleagues.
8
For instane, Caliendo et al. (2010) show that people who have an internal lous of ontrol  with a strong
belief in freedom of hoie and ontrol over their lives  searh for jobs more intensively than individuals with an
external lous of ontrol.
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Figure 5: Are pre-unemployment earnings balaned?
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=Frenh-/Italian-
speaking part. Figure shows the mean of insured pre-unemployment
earnings (logarithm). Lines are loally weighted regression estimates
(bandwidth = 0.8). Soure: Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO), Neuhâtel. Distanes from
searh.h.
German-speaking side, we do not see any jump at the border.
Table 3 provides a disontinuity analysis for a large number of bakground harateristis.
For eah variable, Table 3 reports the sample average of a partiular harateristi (olumn 1),
the mean for Latin-speaking workers (olumn 2), the mean for German-speaking workers (olumn
3), and the dierene between the two (olumn 4). In olumn (5) we report whether the mean of
a harateristi diers at the language border and olumn (6) provides the orresponding analysis
for the language-border dierene within the three bilingual antons (Berne, Fribourg, Valais).
Table 3, Panel A autions against interpreting the gap in unemployment durations being driven
solely by ulture. Many of the individual harateristis we observe are not perfetly balaned
at the Roesti border. Compositional dierenes might also be important at the muniipality
level. Panel B provides measures of muniipalities. While setoral and gender omposition of
muniipalities does not hange at the Roesti border, there are slight imbalanes in terms of the
muniipality-population's eduation- and age struture.
The seond reason why we see dierenes in unemployment durations at the language border
may be a sudden hange in labor demand due to limited labor market integration of the two
regions. If labor demand is lower on the Latin side the language border and labor markets
are not integrated, we would expet longer job searh durations there. Figure 6a displays a
measure of labor market tightness, the ratio of vaanies divided by the number of employed
individuals at the muniipality level (during the rst semester of the year 2000).
9
Figure 6a
9
We prefer the vaany employment ratio to the vaany unemployment ratio beause unemployment is en-
dogenous to ulture. Employment is endogenous as well but will be less aeted quantitatively.
13
Table 3: Summary statistis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Dierene Dierene at border
All Bilingual antons
A. Individual harateristis
Qualiation
% low qualiation .10 .11 .09 .02*** .02 .00
% medium qualiation .11 .11 .10 .01*** -.05*** -.04***
% high qualiation .80 .78 .80 -.02*** .03 .04*
Setor of last job
% agrar .03 .04 .03 .02*** .02*** .02***
% onstrution .13 .15 .12 .03*** -.02 -.02
% manufaturing .18 .20 .18 0.03*** .04** .06***
% servies .46 .42 .48 -.07*** .03 .02
% tourism .06 .06 .06 -.00 -.00 .01
% other setor .08 .09 .08 .01*** .01 .02
Diulty of plaement (aseworker assessment)
% easy to plae .16 .24 .12 .11*** .07*** .06***
% medium to plae .64 .63 .64 -.01** .00 .04*
% hard to plae .18 .11 .22 -.11*** -.09*** -.10***
Mobility
% no mobility .00 .00 .00 .00** -.00 -.00
% daily mobility .90 .85 .93 -.08*** -.06*** -.07***
% mobility: parts of CH .05 .08 .03 .05*** .03*** .04***
% mobility: whole CH .04 .04 .03 .01*** .02** .02**
% mobility: abroad .01 .02 .01 .01*** .01 .01**
Age and Earnings
Age 38.31 37.99 38.48 -.49*** -.10 -.01
Log insured earnings 8.43 8.39 8.45 -.06*** -.03 -.03
Family harateristis
No. of dependents .98 1.09 .92 .17*** .03 .08
% single .51 .48 .53 -.05*** -.00 -.02
% married .38 .42 .36 .06*** .00 .01
% divored .11 .10 .11 -.01*** .00 .01
% widowed .00 .00 .00 .00 -.00 .00
B. Muniipality harateristis
Eduation
% primary eduation .17 .15 .17 -.02*** .02* .03*
% seondary eduation .74 .74 .74 -.00 -.02* -.03**
% other eduation .02 .02 .02 .00 -.01*** -.00**
Setor
% setor 1 .02 .03 .02 .01*** .00 -.00
% setor 2 .13 .13 .13 -.00*** -.02 -.02
% setor 3 .37 .35 .38 -.04*** -.00 -.00
Age struture
% age 25-29 .07 .08 .07 .00*** -.00 -.00
% age 30-34 .09 .09 .09 -.00*** -.01*** -.01***
% age 35-39 .10 .09 .10 -.00*** -.01*** -.01***
% age 40-44 .09 .09 .09 -.00*** -.00 -.00
% age 45-49 .09 .09 .09 .00*** .00 .00
% age 50-54 .08 .09 .09 .00*** .00* .00
% age 55-59 .08 .08 .08 .00** .01*** .01***
Other
% men .46 .46 .47 -.00*** .00 -.00
% other language .01 .01 .01 -.00*** .00 -.00
Log no. of inhabitants 8.63 7.96 8.98 -1.02*** -.49 -.46
% agglomeration .46 .20 .60 -.40*** -.13 -.24**
C. Ative labor market poliies
% days in santion .06 .04 .07 -.02*** -.01** -.01
% days in training program .12 .13 .11 .01*** .03*** .03***
% days in employment program .01 .01 .01 -.00*** -.00 -.00
% days in subsidized employment .11 .11 .11 .00 -.00 -.01
Notes: Latin = majority in ommunity speaks Frenh, Italian or Romansh. Dierene at the
border is estimated using linear speiations. Soure: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-
2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO), CH-2010 Neuhatel. Distanes from
searh.h.
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Figure 6: Labor demand and labor market integration
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b. Workplaes with other language
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=Frenh-/Italian-speaking part. Figure (a) shows
the number of vaanies posted between January and June 2000 by all rms of a given muniipality,
divided by the number of employed individuals in the working age population (16-64 years) living in
that muniipality. Figure (b) shows the share of workers being native speakers of the language of the
other language border (Frenh/Italian in German-speaking region, German in Latin-region region).
Regression lines are loally weighted estimates (bandwidth = 0.8). Soure: Unemployment Register
1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO), Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
indiates no important border-disontinuity in this measure. If at all, we would expet a slightly
better situation on the Latin-speaking side of the the language border. A seond way to hek the
onern that the Roesti border may separate labor markets is to analyze labor market integration
in terms of ommuting. Figure 6b reports the share of workers living in the German region
and working in the Latin region (and vie versa) as fration of employment in the partiular
loation.
10
This graph learly shows that labor markets are integrated. Many rms loated lose
to the language border hire workers from the other side of the language border, up to 20 perent
of their workfore at the border. There is an important onlusion to be drawn from Figure
6b. The fat that many workers ross the language border when going to work suggest that this
border is permeable and this ross-hiring pattern is quite symmetri on both sides of the border.
This suggests there is high integration of labor markets. Hene it is very unlikely that border
dierenes in labor market outomes are driven by dierenes in labor market onditions.
Dierenes in the implementation of labor market poliies at the loal level ould also ra-
tionalize dierenes in job nding at the language border. Unemployment insurane regulations
are set at the national level but there is a fair amount of leeway in how these regulations are
implemented. Loal labor market oes have disretion in the extent to whih the various labor
market poliy instruments (santions, assignments to ALMPs, et.) are used. Table 3, Panel C
reports four key elements of ative labor market poliy: santions, training programs, employ-
ment programs, and job subsidies. Latin-speaking workers indeed fae a lower santion rate and
a higher assignment rate to training programs. This suggests there are some dierenes at the
Roesti border at the poliy-implementation dimension. In our regression analysis below, we will
10
This is the share speaking a Latin language for rms loated in the German speaking area and the share of
German speakers for rms loated on the Latin speaking areas.
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ontrol for ative labor market poliies to aount for dierenes in job nding rates along this
dimension.
5 A simple model of searh and regional mobility
In this setion we develop a simple theoretial framework to study how attitudes towards work
and unemployment may aet job searh ativities.
11
This model is not only useful to predit
how attitudes aet job searh behavior but also to study possible sorting of heterogeneous
workers aross regions. Sorting ould be relevant as the language border ontrast may partly be
driven by unobserved fators that indue ertain workers to move to the other region.
Consider workers who are either employed or unemployed. Employed workers earn a wage
w and lose their job with rate δ. Unemployed workers get an unemployment benet b and
suer from a (ow) ost γs2/2 + z during their unemployment spell, where s is the worker's
(endogenously hosen) searh intensity; γ > 0 is an exogenous parameter (that varies aross
individuals); and z is a xed psyhi ost of unemployment (that varies aross regions but is
the same for individuals within a region). A worker who searhes with intensity s, gets a job
oer at rate sλ, where λ is the job nding rate per unit of searh. A job oer is from the same
region with probability π and from the other region with probability 1−π, hene job oers from
the same and the other region arrive at rates πsλ and (1 − π)sλ, respetively. We assume that
taking up a new job in the other region is assoiated with a mobility ost x, while aepting a
job in the same region is ostless.
Searh and mobility hoies. Denote by r the disount rate, and by U and E the present
value of inome of an unemployed and an employed worker, respetively. In steady state, the
value of employment is rE = w − δ(E − U) and the value of unemployment is rU = b − z −
γc(s) + sλ [W − U ], where W ≡ πE + (1 − π)max (U,E− − x) is the expeted value of a job
oer. (E denotes the value of a new job in the same region and E− denotes the value of a job in
the other region.) The problem of an unemployed worker is to hoose searh intensity s so as to
maximize rU . This yields the rst-order ondition
γs(γ) = λ(W − U), (1)
where s(γ) is the worker's optimal searh intensity.
Suppose that workers dier in the searh ost parameter γ but are idential in all other
dimensions. High-γ workers are less eient searhers: to ahieve a given job arrival rate λs
they have to inur higher searh osts. A higher γ may be due to higher individual disutility
(i.e. lower motivation) during times of job searh; worse networks (fewer weak ties); more limited
aess to alternative searh hannels (in addition to those provided by publi employment oes);
11
Other theoretial work has highlighted the role of impatiene in job searh. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)
disuss empirial evidene and Paserman (2008) provides strutural estimation of models of job searh with
impatiene (or hyperboli disounting).
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or some ombination of these fators. This yields
Result 1: Optimal searh and mobility.
a) s(γ) dereases in γ and inreases in z. b) There is a γˆ, suh that a worker with γ > γˆ
aepts a job oer from the other region, while a worker with γ ≤ γˆ does not. ) γˆ is dereasing
in z.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for part a) of this result is straightforward. A worker with a high γ faes a high
(marginal) ost of searh, induing a low s. A higher z is equivalent to a lower unemployment
benet, resulting in a higher s. Part b) of the Result says that high-γ workers are more mobile
than low-γ workers. The intuition is that high-γ workers suer more during unemployment,
hene they gain more when moving from unemployment to employment. In other words, the
dierene W − U is higher for high-γ workers. Hene workers with a higher γ are more likely
willing to bear the mobility ost.
Regional dierenes Regions dier in two dimensions. First, there are dierenes in the
distribution of γ-types. For simpliity, assume a disrete distribution with three types i = 0, 1, 2
suh that γ0 < γ1 < γ2. We normalize population size in eah region to unity and denote by
fij the share of worker of type i born in region j and therefore sharing the ulture of region j.
(Some of these workers may eventually end up in region −j.) We onsider the ase where low-γ
types are less prevalent in region L and assume f0L < f0G and f2L > f2G.
Seond, we assume that that the psyhi ost of unemployment is smaller in region L, zL ≤ zG.
Ceteris paribus, being unemployed is less ostly in region L than in region G. Aording to Result
1, this indues a worker with a given γ to searh less hard in region L.
Steady-state mobility and job searh behavior We are now ready to disuss the issue of
partiular interest: Whih types will end up unemployed in whih region? We rst note that
regional dierenes in z lead to regional dierenes in mobility behavior. Aording to Result
1), the assumption zL ≤ zG implies γˆL > γˆG. This means an unemployed worker searhing
in region L aepts a job oer from region G when γ > γˆL, while she delines when γ ≤ γˆL.
Similarly, a searher in G aepts an oer from L when γ > γˆG, and delines when γ ≤ γˆG. We
assume that γ0 < γˆG < γ1 < γˆL < γ2: Workers with γ = γ0 are not willing to move and will
stay in their region of birth. Workers with γ = γ1 are willing to move when searhing in region
G but not willing to move when searhing in region L. (This implies that, in steady state, all
workers with γ1 will eventually end up in region L, irrespetive of their region of birth.) Finally,
workers with γ = γ2 are willing to move to the other region. We show in the Appendix that an
endogenous fration φ > 1/2 of γ2-workers will end up in region L (irrespetive of their region
of birth), while a fration 1− φ will end up in region G.
Empirially, we annot observe an individual worker's type, but we an observe both her
region of residene/searh and her native language (= region of birth). Let us onsider the
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model's preditions on the type omposition of the unemployment pool by region of residene
and region of birth. Denote by uij the steady-state unemployment rate of type i in region j. In
region L, there are f0Lu0L unemployed workers of type 0; (f1L + f1G)u1L workers of type 1; and
φ(f2L + f2G)u2L workers of type 2. In region G, there are f0Gu0G unemployed workers of type
0; no unemployment workers of type 1; and (1− φ)(f2G + f2L)u2G workers of type 2. Denote by
dij the expeted duration of unemployment of type i in region j. We have dij = 1/ (λπsij) for
types i = 0, 1 and d2j = 1/ (λs2j). Let djj′ be the average unemployment duration of workers
born in region j and searhing in j′.
Result 2: Regional dierenes in mobility and unemployment durations.
a) Regional mobility is higher among workers born in L than among workers born in G. b)
When f0L and f2G are suiently small and zG ≫ zL, we have dGG < dLG < dGL < dLL.
Proof. See Appendix.
Disussion and alternative explanations. The model aptures the idea that regional dif-
ferenes in the type-distribution and psyhi osts of unemployment drive mobility and unem-
ployment duration patterns. Our empirial analysis below douments that workers born in L
are indeed more mobile and that duration patterns by region of birth and searh are as in part
b) of Result 2. Result 2 states that regional dierenes along these two dimensions sue to
reprodue mobility and unemployment duration patterns observed in the data.
12
Clearly, observed outomes may be due to regional dierenes in other dimensions and unre-
lated to regional dierenes in work attitudes. There are two obvious ompeting explanations:
(i) a weaker labor market in region L and (ii) employer-disrimination against workers born in
L. Regional labor market dierenes are aptured by wG > wL and/or λG > λL. In the model,
dierenes in w and/or λ lead to qualitatively similar preditions as zG > zL. A model based on
regional dierenes in labor market onditions an also apture some of the patterns observed in
the data, although we always get dGL > dLL.
13
With employer disrimination against workers
born in L, it is diult to rationalize dGL > dLG. Moreover, a model based on an idential
distribution of types is unable to generate asymmetri mobility patterns by region of birth.
In sum, our simple model an generate mobility and unemployment duration patterns as
observed in the data, while this is more diult with alternative explanations based on identi-
al type-distributions. Clearly, this does not mean that these alternative explanations are not
relevant empirially. Below we explore in more detail the relevane of these alternative meha-
nisms to rationalize the dierenes in unemployment durations aross regions (of birth and/or
12
Notie that the psyhi ost of unemployment may atually derive from the γ-distribution within a region,
as the psyhi ost z may be the endogenous outome of soial interation: when there are more high-γ types
around you, you experiene a lower psyhi ost z, whih indues you to searh less hard. Hene the primitives of
the model boil down to dierenes in the distribution of types by ultural bakground (= region of birth). In this
sense, our model does not rely on more exogenous parameters than other models to desribe ultural dierenes.
13
In steady state region L attrats a fration φ of type-2, both of workers born in L and born in G; all type-1
workers from both regions; and all type-0 worker born in region L but no type-0 workers born in region G. The
relative size of type-2 and type-1 is the same among workers born in L and G, there are also type 0 workers in
the LL pool but not in the GL pool. It follows that dGL > dLL.
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residene).
6 Empirial Strategy
This setion disusses our empirial strategy. We start with a simple redued-form equation to
explain unemployment durations. (Similarly, for regional mobility hoies). Let yicg denote the
number of weeks job seeker i remains unemployed in muniipality c whih belongs to soiety g
where g takes on two values, L and G.
yicg = τ
′
iα+ z
′
gβ + x
′
iγ + w
′
cδ + θi + ψc + νicg (2)
The vetor τ refers to ulturally shaped determinants of y (related to ost and eieny of job
searh, the number of weak ties, et.) that vary at the individual level. The vetor zg refers
to ulturally shaped determinants of y that vary at the level of the ultural group g. These
fators inlude soial norms, soial santions, importane of work, et. The vetors xi and wc
refer to observable harateristis that inuene the duration of unemployment that vary at the
individual, or muniipality level. The terms θi and ψc refer to unobserved determinants of y that
vary at the individual or muniipality level. Finally, νicg is a lassial regression error term.
Our main objetive is to assess whether α and/or β ontain non-zero elements. Simply
estimating equation (2) will not be helpful in this endeavor beause elements of τ and z ould be
orrelated with unobserved individual or group level heterogeneity. Controlling for θi in a panel
setting is hallenging sine the duration of a spell at t − 1 aets the likelihood of observing a
spell at t. Controlling for ψc in a panel setting ould potentially work but only for job seekers
who move between muniipalities.
We analyze the role of ulture by ontrasting unemployment durations (and mobility hoies)
at the Roesti border, to whih we refer as the "Language Border Contrast" (LBC) in what follows.
Let sc be the driving distane in kilometers to get from muniipality c to the border between
language regions. We dene distane to border to be zero for muniipalities loated exatly
on the Latin speaking side of the language border (whose nearest neighboring muniipality is
German speaking). Distane is positive for any other muniipality in Switzerland. To reet
both distane and language region, we ode the distane measure negatively for ommunities in
the German-speaking regions and positively for the Latin-speaking regions, so sc ≥ 0 identies a
muniipality in the Latin speaking part and sc < 0 is a muniipality on the German speaking side
of the language border.
14
Let EF (y) denote the limit of the expetation of y on the Frenh side of
the language border, i.e. EL(y) ≡ limǫ→0E(Y |sc = 0 + ǫ), and EG(y) ≡ limǫ→0E(Y |sc = 0− ǫ)
14
For instane, Geneva  the Westernmost ity  is loated +129 km away from the barrier, St. Gallen, the
largest ity in the East is 132 km away from the border. Zurih is  100 km away and Lausanne is +52 km away
from the language barrier. The ity of Fribourg (apital of the bilingual anton Fribourg) is loated exatly on
the language barrier. In the job seeker data, the average distane to the language border is 63.9 kilometers for job
seekers in Frenh or Italian or Romansh speaking areas, and 77.3 kilometers for job seekers who live in German
speaking areas. Fousing on job seekers who live in bilingual antons (Berne, Fribourg and Valais) redues average
distane to border to 25.4 kilometers on the Frenh or Italian speaking side, and to 35.2 kilometers on the German
speaking side.
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denotes the orresponding expetation when approahing the language border from the German
side. The border ontrast in unemployment duration is
EL[yicg]− EG[yicg] = [EL(τi)− EG(τi)]
′α+ [zL − zG]
′β (3)
+ [EL(xi)− EG(xi)]
′γ + [EL(wc)− EG(wc)]
′δ
+ EL(θi)− EG(θi) + EL(ψc)− EG(ψc)
The rst line of the LBC informs on the joint role of individual and group level omponents of
ulture if the language border is a ultural border, i.e. the distribution of τi and/or the elements
in zg dier aross the two language regions. The seond line shows that the ontrast will also
be driven by observable ompositional dierenes (the x dierene) or by group level observed
fators (the w dierene). The nal line of the LBC shows the key identiation hallenge.
Any unobserved individual or group level fator that varies aross soial groups at the border
will onfounded estimates of the importane of ultural fators (rst line). In sum, the LBC
will provide point identiation if the ultural determinants τ and z are disontinuous at the
border whereas the unobserved ompositional dierenes θi and unobserved muniipality level
determinants ψc are ontinuous.
Note that the LBC is related, but not idential, to the spatial regression disontinuity design
(S-RDD). The key dierene between the LBC and an S-RDD is that distane to border an and
will be manipulated by individuals. Indeed, the framework we disussed earlier predits that job
seekers will move to the region that maximizes their disounted future utility. This makes point
identiation of the ultural determinants of job searh outomes impossible. Nonetheless, the
LBC an be used to approximate the order of magnitude of ultural determinants if unobserved
omposition and group level eets vary at a lower order of magnitude than ultural determinants.
Moreover, the model plaes restritions on the way that harateristis should dier at the
language border. Based on the arguments put forth by the theoretial model, we expet job
seekers on the Latin-side of the border to have more favorable harateristis than job seekers
on the German-side of the border. Indeed, Table 3 shows that job seekers on the Frenh side of
the language border are better qualied and more easy to plae than job seekers who live on the
German side of the language border. This suggests that the raw LBC provides a lower bound
on the role of purely ultural fators aeting unemployment.
The term in equation (3) an be measured in the ontext of the following regression, whih
resembles the spatial disontinuity regression (Lee and Lemieux (2010)). Let Lc = 1 if munii-
pality c is loated in the Swiss Latin region, and Lc = 0 if muniipality c is loated in the Swiss
German region. Consider the following linear regression
yicg = π0 + π1Lc + π2Sc + π3LcSc + ν˜ic (4)
where the terms in Sc and LcSc apture a two sided linear trend between unemployment duration
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and distane to language border. The parameter estimate for π1 is a onsistent estimate of
[E+(τi)−E−(τi)]
′α+[zF−zG]
′β, the key ultural omponent of (3), provided that the speiation
aptures dierenes in unemployment duration aross regions appropriately. This is a restritive
assumption as our disussion in setion 4 shows. We probe the sensitivity of our results by
inluding observed determinants of unemployment duration in our regressions below.
7 Does ulture matter for unemployment?
This setion presents the main results of the eonometri analysis. We start by estimating the
LBC in unemployment durations. We then test the additional predition that job mobility is
systematially aeted by ultural bakground. The setion loses with a disussion of two
important ompeting explanations: language skills and disrimination.
7.1 The language-border ontrast for unemployment durations
Table 4 presents estimates of the unemployment duration gap at the language border based on
equation (4). The dependent variable is log unemployment duration.
15
All regressions in Table 4
fous on job seekers living no farther than 50 kilometers from the language border. Regressions
ontrol for anton (=state) dummies, for inow year and quarter, and a set of dummies for large
ities. Introduing anton dummies is of partiular importane in the present ontext beause
antonal borders are also institutional borders and beause antons might dier in terms of labor
market onditions. Moreover, ontrolling for large urban enters is important beause they may
drive the distane-to-border eets in the regressions. Standard errors aount for lustering at
the level of eah muniipality.
16
Column (1) of Table 4 provides a rst estimate for the LBC in unemployment durations.
Estimates indiate that unemployment durations are, on average, 0.183 log points longer on
the Latin-speaking side of the language border. This estimate is both quantitatively important
and statistially highly signiant. Column (2) adds individual harateristis to the regression.
Controlling for these harateristis, the dierene in unemployment durations inreases to .226
log points. The remaining two olumns of Table 4 introdue additional ontrols. Column (3) of
Table 4 ontrols for muniipality harateristis. Although most of these variables (in partiular,
age struture, eduation levels, and muniipality size) have a statistially signiant impat on
unemployment durations, introduing these additional ontrols does not hange the magnitude
of the estimated LBC. The point estimate dereases slightly to .202.
Column (4) in Table 4 heks for labor demand onditions within antons by introduing
detailed muniipality indiators to apture loal dierenes in labor demand.
17
These india-
15
Right ensored spells are kept in the sample but note that only 5.2 % of all spells are right ensored. Moreover,
Table 8 presents estimates of the umulative distribution of spells whih are not aeted by right ensoring. Results
in Table 8 are onsistent with the main results in Table 4.
16
Card and Lee (2008) argue that errors need to be lustered with respet to the running variable if the running
variable is not measured on a ontinuous sale. Note that this type of lustering is not needed in our ontext
sine distane to border is measured on a ontinuous sale.
17
See Table A.1 in the Appendix for desriptive statistis of labor demand.
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Table 4: Culture and unemployment: LBC
Dependent variable: log unemployment duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline
Latin 0.183*** 0.226*** 0.202*** 0.196*** 0.174***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Distane (100km) -0.104 -0.190** -0.115 -0.087 -0.067
(0.081) (0.086) (0.080) (0.078) (0.068)
Distane · Latin 0.241* 0.328*** 0.257** 0.222* 0.136
(0.124) (0.126) (0.117) (0.115) (0.102)
Constant 4.454*** 2.644*** 2.252*** 2.267*** 2.389***
(0.0532) (0.140) (0.309) (0.317) (0.321)
Fixed eets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual ontrols No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Muniipality harateristis No No Yes Yes Yes
Labor demand No No No Yes Yes
Labor market poliy No No No No Yes
Observations 60,713 60,713 60,713 60,713 60,713
R-squared 0.044 0.096 0.101 0.101 0.102
Notes: Standard errors robust and lustered on muniipality level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin = majority in muniipality speaks Frenh or Italian. Distane
= distane to language border (in 100 kilometers road distane.) Latin language border
muniipalities have distane = 0km. All regressions are limited to muniipalities within
50km from the language border. Fixed eets inlude anton (state) and year and
quarter FE, as well as FE for large ities. Individual ontrols inlude skills, setor of
last job, employment prospets assessed by the aseworker, previous earnings, family
bakground, willingness to move to another region. Muniipality harateristis inlude
muniipality eduation levels, demographi struture, muniipality size, agglomeration.
Labor demand inludes the number of available jobs in the munipality in the year
2001, the inrease in the number of jobs and rms between 1998-2001, number of
vaanies between January and June 2000 per employed resident. Labor market poliy
inludes the probability to get assigned to eah of the following measures: santions,
training programs, employment programs, subsidized employment. Soure: Data
from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe
(FSO), CH-2010 Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
tors ontrol for labor demand onditions in addition to persistent dierenes in labor market
onditions aross antons (reall that all regressions ontrol for antonal dummies). Introduing
these muniipality indiators has no eet on the estimated LBC in unemployment durations. It
appears that antonal dummies apture dierenes in labor market onditions well. Our baseline
estimate indiates that unemployment duration lasts for .196 log points longer on the Swiss Latin
side of the border than would be expeted from the Swiss German side. Evaluated at the sample
mean unemployment duration of 31 weeks, this translates into an eet of 7 additional weeks of
unemployment (= 31× (exp(.196) − 1)).
Column (5) in Table 4 additionally ontrols for measures of ative labor market poliy. In-
formation on the number of days in santions, training programs, employment programs, and
subsidized employment is aggregated on the muniipal level and divided by the aggregated num-
ber of days in unemployment. This yields a measure for the probability of being exposed to
one of these ative labor market poliy measures. Remember that ative labor market poliy
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is determined on the loal level and thus varies aross language regions (see Table 5 above).
However, it turns out that dierenes in ative labor market poliies do not have a major impat
on the estimated dierene in unemployment durations at the language border.
In sum, Table 4 shows that the LBC in unemployment durations is not partiularly sen-
sitive to adding ontrols. In setion 4.3 we have seen that, among individuals living lose to
the language border, the imbalanes in harateristis aross language regions are onsiderably
redued. Nevertheless, a number of bakground harateristis remain unbalaned in ways that
favor job seekers on the Latin-speaking side. For instane, Latin-speaking job seekers are slightly
better qualied, easier to plae, and more mobile. To shed further light on this issue we regress
individual, muniipality, and labor demand on log unemployment durations based on obser-
vations of individuals living in the German-speaking region. We then predit unemployment
durations of individuals living in the Latin-speaking region (using parameters obtained from the
German-region regression and harateristis from the Latin-region sample)  and vie versa for
the German-speaking region.
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This allows assessing the overall ontribution of imbalanes in
bakground harateristis to the language border unemployment dierential.
Figure 7 shows average atual log unemployment duration (solid lines) as well as average
predited log unemployment duration (dashed lines) for both language regions. While there
are some dierenes in terms of the omposition of the job seeker pool at the language border,
these dierenes are not very large. The top dashed line is substantially higher than the top
solid line at the language border, suggesting that residents of German Swiss border towns have
harateristis that would lead them to be unemployed longer than their neighbors on the Latin
side of the language border. Conversely, the bottom solid line for Swiss Germans is a bit higher
than the bottom dashed line. Taken together, this indiates that ompositional dierenes in the
unemployment pool disadvantage Swiss German job seekers ompared to Swiss Latin job seekers.
This explains why the LBC in unemployment durations is somewhat higher when bakground
harateristis are ontrolled for. Provided that unobserved harateristis of job seekers follow
the same pattern of imbalane as observed ones, our results identify a lower bound of the true
LBC in unemployment durations.
Interestingly, this pattern of results is in line with the preditions of the theoretial framework.
Aording to the above model, the average duration of unemployment in the Latin-speaking
region (with a larger fration of ineient job searhers) is shorter with regional mobility than
in the absene of regional mobility. A relatively large fration of ineient job seekers leave the
Latin-speaking region, while the fration of individuals that leave the German-speaking region is
smaller. One we ondition on important proxies of job market hanes in the empirial analysis,
the dierential gets indeed wider. This again implies that our estimates probably identify a lower
18
Speially, we disuss omposition eets as follows. We rst run regressions with separate parameters in eah
language region, i.e. yij = x
′
ijβj + ǫij where j ∈ {G,L}. We then alulate expeted duration of unemployment
of Swiss German residents as predited with the Swiss Latin parameters, i.e. x¯GβˆL, and expeted duration of
unemployment of Swiss Latin residents as predited with Swiss German parameters, i.e. x¯LβˆG. Figure 7 reports
these ounterfatual preditions using dashed lines. Contrasting the dashed line on one side of the border with the
orresponding solid line on the other side of the border informs on the extent of imbalane in terms of observed
harateristis at the border.
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Figure 7: Predited and atual log unemployment duration
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Dashed lines show predited unemployment duration using data from
the German speaking part of Switzerland to predit duration in the
Latin speaking part and vie versa (only data within 50km from the lan-
guage border used for predition). Linear predition. Lines are loally
weighted regressions (bandwidth = 0.8). Soure: Unemployment Reg-
ister 1998-2003 and Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO),
Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
bound on the eet of ultural bakground on unemployment durations.
In a next step, we assess the robustness of the estimated eet by looking at dierent segments
of the language border (Table 5). Column 1 repeats the estimate of olumn 4 in Table 4 for ease
of omparison. Results in olumns 2 and 3 disuss sensitivity of the main result to funtional
form of the distane to language border trends. Column 2 limits the sample to job seekers living
no farther than 25 km from the border. This an be understood as a loal linear estimate of
the unemployment border dierential. Loal linear estimates indiate that the dierene in log
duration is .162 log points. This estimate is slightly but insigniantly smaller than the baseline
estimate. Row 3 presents estimates that add squared terms in distane adopting a polynomial
approximation to the underlying distane to border funtion. Again, adding higher order terms
allows assessing sensitivity to funtional form. Estimates that are based on a two-sided quadrati
estimate of distane to language border are very muh in line with the baseline estimates. We
onlude from evidene in olumns 2 and 3 that sensitivity to funtional form is not an issue.
Bilingual antons are essential in the identiation of the LBC. Column 4 in table 5 reports
estimates that fous on job seekers who live in one of the three bilingual antons: Berne, Fribourg,
and Valais. Bilingual anton estimates are very muh in line with baseline estimates. This
suggests that mis-speiation of the model outside the bilingual antons is not an issue. Column
5 reports estimates based on the segment between the German and the Latin speaking parts of
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Table 5: Language barrier eet in unemployment durations
Dependent variable: log unemployment duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Bilingual Frenh-German
antons border
linear linear quadrati linear linear
50km 25km 50km 50km 50km
Latin 0.196*** 0.162*** 0.195*** 0.211*** 0.194***
(0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.046) (0.037)
Distane (100km) -0.087 0.225 -0.112 -0.136 -0.146*
(0.078) (0.268) (0.095) (0.102) (0.081)
Distane · Latin 0.222* 0.350 0.418*** 0.287* 0.254**
(0.115) (0.339) (0.147) (0.155) (0.116)
Constant 2.267*** 1.423** 2.202*** 1.406*** 2.331***
(0.317) (0.720) (0.320) (0.484) (0.331)
Observations 60,713 22,996 60,713 27,258 55,935
Identifying observations 30,216 13,426 30,216 27,258 27,258
R-squared 0.101 0.105 0.101 0.104 0.102
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin =
majority in ommunity speaks Frenh, Italian or Romansh. Distane = distane to lan-
guage border (in 100 kilometers road distane). Squared Distane = regression inludes
a squared term in distane and an interation term Latin · distane squared. Bilingual
antons = anton of Berne, Valais, Fribourg (German / Frenh antons). Frenh (Italian)
border: German speaking muniipalities that have as nearest Latin neighbor a Frenh
(Italian) speaking muniipality and Frenh (Italian) speaking muniipalities. Observa-
tions from olumn (5) and (6) do not add up to olumn (1) beause of Romansh speaking
muniipalities and their nearest neighbours. All ontrols as in table 3. Identifying obser-
vations are within anton observations (antons of BE, FR, VS, GR). Soure: Data from
Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO),
CH-2010 Neuhâtel. Distanes from searh.h.
Switzerland. Results indiate that the unemployment dierential is on the order of .194 log
points, i.e. very similar to the baseline estimate.
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7.2 Mobility
As emphasized above, unemployment dierentials at the language border are partly the outome
of mobility of job seekers aross language regions. This means that our empirial strategy is not
idential to a spatial RDD. This provided the motivation for our theoretial framework. In this
framework, job seekers from the region with the larger fration of ineient job-seekers will be
more likely to move to the other region. This framework also yields preditions on unemployment
duration patterns of movers and stayers, by region of birth (i.e. ultural bakground) whih we
an test empirially.
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We also ontrast the Italian and German speaking parts of the ountry (results are not shown). For the Italian-
German language border, the point estimate is somewhat larger than the baseline estimate, but not statistially
signiant. Notie, however, that the high standard error is due to the low within anton variane that an be
used to identify the eet. Identiation is based on a few ommunities with a majority of the Italian-speaking
residents in the anton Graubünden.The only antons where there are Italian-speaking ommunities are the anton
Tiino and the anton Graubünden, loated in the South and the South-East, respetively. The anton Tiino
onsists entirely of Italian speaking ommunities. In Graubünden, some ommunities are Italian, but the vast
majority speaks Swiss German.
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Table 6: Regional Mobility and Unemployment Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mover mover log duration log duration
with ontrols with ontrols
Latin speaker 0.0634*** 0.148***
(0.0212) (0.0572)
Latin stayer 0.257*** 0.215***
(0.0229) (0.0268)
Moved Latin to German 0.107*** 0.112***
(0.0283) (0.0326)
Moved German to Latin 0.296*** 0.156***
(0.0415) (0.0401)
Constant 0.0247*** 0.0265*** 4.766*** 4.766***
(0.00366) (0.00423) (0.0132) (0.00785)
Observations 60,713 60,713 60,713 60,713
R-squared 0.020 0.084 0.011 0.101
Mean dependent variable 0.0478 0.0478 4.860 4.860
Notes: Standard errors robust and lustered on muniipality level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin = majority in muniipality speaks Frenh or Italian.
Distane = distane to language border (in 100 kilometers road distane.) Latin
speaker = 1 if individual has Frenh, Italian, or Romansh native language, and =0
otherwise. Latin stayer = 1 for Latin speaker who lives in Latin speaking region,
and = 0 otherwise. Moved Latin to German = 1 for Latin speaker who lives in
Latin region, and = 0 otherwise. Moved German to Latin = 1 for German speaker
who lives in Latin region, and = 0 otherwise. Fixed eets inlude anton (state)
and year and quarter FE, as well as FE for large ities. Controls inlude skills,
setor of last job, employment prospets assessed by the aseworker, previous
earnings, family bakground, willingness to move to another region, muniipality
eduation levels, demographi struture, muniipality size, agglomeration, number
of available jobs in the muniipality in the year 2001, the inrease in the number of
jobs and rms between 1998-2001, number of vaanies between January and June
2000 per employed resident. Soure: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-
2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO), CH-2010 Neuhatel.
Distanes from searh.h.
Table 6 reports results for mobility and duration onditional on moving. Columns (1) and (2)
disuss regional mobility, a binary indiator that takes the value 1 if the individual lives in a region
that does not speak his native language, and it takes the value 0 otherwise. Column (1) shows
that Latin speakers are 6.3 perentage points more likely to move aross the language border
than German speakers. Column (2) adds all the ontrol variables we use in our main analysis
of unemployment duration and shows that atual mobility is 15 perentage points higher among
Latin speakers ompared to German speakers. This result is onsistent with our theoretial
framework.
Columns (3) and (4) provide results on average duration of unemployment by past mobility
status. Job-seekers born and searhing in the Latin region ("Latin stayers") have the longest
unemployment durations, while job-seekers born and searhing in the German-speaking region
("German stayers"), the referene group, have the shortest duration. Job-seekers born in the
German-speaking but searhing in the Latin-speaking region ("German movers") have somewhat
shorter durations than job seekers born in the Latin-speaking region (both movers and stayers).
Notie that the results in olumn (4) are onsistent with Result 2 b) of our theoretial framework.
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When there are (i) many ineient (eient) job seekers among individuals born in the Latin-
(German-) speaking region, and (ii) higher region-spei osts of unemployment, the model
predits preisely the outome observed in olumn (4) of Table 6.
7.3 Alternative Explanations
In this setion, we onsider the two key ompeting explanations to ulture: language skills and
disrimination.
7.3.1 Language: human apital or proxy for ulture?
We rst take a loser look at the question whether an individual's language just reets an
individual's human apital rather than ultural norms and values. Notie that, as long as the
Latin language is as valuable in the Latin region as is the German language in the German
region, an individual's own language per se should not generate any dierenes in labor market
outomes. However, it ould still be that Latins are less proient in the German language than
are Germans in the relevant Latin language. This is potentially important in the present ontext,
as the Latin eet is identied at the language border. Individuals living lose to the border
might fae worse job opportunities if they do not speak the other language. The Latin gap ould
just reet dierenes in human apital rather than dierenes in attitudes towards work and
job searh.
Column (1) of Table 7 measures language proieny of Roesti border residents. Results
indiate Latins are less proient in German than vie versa. The perentage who knows the
language spoken just aross the border is 20 perentage points lower on the Latin side ompared to
the German side. This is a sizeable gap in language proieny. To see whether this dierene an
aount for the observed dierenes in unemployment durations, we split the sample aording
to language proieny. The language border ontrast is of the same magnitude, indepently of
the language proieny of the job seekers.
7.3.2 Disrimination versus searh intensities
One ould argue that the LBC in unemployment durations reets disrimination by employers
against Latin-speaking job seekers. To shed light on the importane of disrimination, we exploit
information available in the AVAM database on how a new job was started: (i) whether the
unemployed worker him found the job; or (ii) whether the aseworker at the loal labor oe
mediated the new job.
We argue that studying how unemployed individuals nd jobs is informative on disrimina-
tory behavior by employers for the following reason: If unemployment dierenes arise beause
employers disriminate against Latins, this should show up in both exit hannels equally. Firms
are entral both to jobs that job seekers loate themselves and to jobs that aseworkers at the
employment oe mediate. If employer disrimination is a rst-order explanation, we should
see lower exit rates, irrespetive of whether workers loated the job themselves or whether jobs
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Table 7: Language skills and unemployment durations
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: knows other language log unemployment duration
know don't know
other language other language
Latin -0.217*** 0.278*** 0.275***
(0.0427) (0.0468) (0.0528)
Distane (100km) 0.817*** -0.0531 0.0127
(0.0977) (0.111) (0.117)
Distane · Latin -1.319*** 0.445*** 0.294
(0.115) (0.163) (0.179)
Constant -0.124 2.759*** 4.238***
(0.306) (0.538) (0.424)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Muniipality Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 60,713 25,935 34,778
R-squared 0.088 0.100 0.093
Notes: Standard errors robust and lustered on muniipality level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Know other language means, know German if living in
Latin-Swiss part, know Frenh/Italian if living in German-Swiss part. Latin =
majority in muniipality speaks Frenh, Italian or Romansh. Distane = distane
to language border (in 100 kilometers road distane.) Latin language border
muniipalities have distane = 0km. Fixed eets inlude anton (state) and
year and quarter FE, as well as FE for large ities. Other ontrols are individual
harateristis, ommunity harateristis, labor demand ontrols. Soure: Data
from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistial
Oe (FSO), CH-2010 Neuhatel. Distanes from searh.h.
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Table 8: Exit Channels: Linear Probability Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All exits Self PES Other
1 month
Latin -0.0217** -0.0244*** 0.0052** -0.0025
(0.0085) (0.0061) (0.0025) (0.0047)
[0.0784℄ [0.0463℄ [0.0080℄ [0.0241℄
3 months
Latin -0.0534*** -0.0581*** 0.0132** -0.0085
(0.0146) (0.0118) (0.0067) (0.0080)
[0.334℄ [0.221℄ [0.0424℄ [0.0714℄
6 months
Latin -0.0804*** -0.0911*** 0.0307*** -0.0200**
(0.013) (0.0137) (0.0104) (0.0094)
[0.589℄ [0.365℄ [0.0852℄ [0.139℄
12 months
Latin -0.0503*** -0.0889*** 0.0475*** -0.0089
(0.0101) (0.0151) (0.0129) (0.0109)
[0.785℄ [0.446℄ [0.123℄ [0.217℄
Observations 60,713 60,713 60,713 60,713
Notes: Standard errors robust and lustered on muniipality level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Share exiting in squared brakets.
Exit rates estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Latin =ma-
jority in muniipality speaks Frenh, Italian or Romansh. Distane
= distane to language border (in 100 kilometers road distane.)
Latin language border muniipalities have distane = 0km. Fixed
eets inlude anton (state) and year and quarter FE, as well as
FE for large ities. Other ontrols are individual harateristis,
ommunity harateristis, labor demand ontrols. Soure: Data
from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Fed-
eral Statistial Oe (FSO), CH-2010 Neuhatel. Distanes from
searh.h.
were mediated by the employment oe. In ontrast, job seekers' searh eort is learly entral
in loating jobs individually, but searh eort is less ruial for jobs publi employment oes
mediate. These jobs are assigned by aseworkers, and job seekers who refuse to apply for suh a
job run into the risk of having their benets withheld.
Table 8 presents the oeients of the LBC in unemployment durations by exit hannels
at various durations of unemployment. More preisely, the table provides estimates of the u-
mulative distribution funtion of spell durations, i.e. simple linear probability models with the
dependent variable indiating whether the unemployment spell lasted less than x months (where
x=1,3,6,12), separately for eah exit hannel. Regressions inlude the full set of harateristis
as in our preferred unemployment duration model (see Table 4, olumn 4).
Column 1 does not distinguish between exit hannels, i.e. the oeients report the LBC in
the probability that the unemployment spell is shorter than x months. (Numbers in parenthesis
below the oeient are standard errors, and numbers in brakets give the mean of the depen-
dent variable.) Consistent with our basi ndings in Table 4, the oeients indiate that the
probability of leaving the unemployment register within 1 month is 2.17 perentage points lower
in the Latin-speaking regions, and the gap widens to 8.04 perentage points within 6 months
duration and stays at 5.03 perentage points after a duration of 12 months.
Columns 2-4 of Table 8 report the orresponding estimates from regressions that are run
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separately for three exit states: jobs found on own-initiative (olumn 2); aseworker-mediated
jobs (olumn 3); and other exits (olumn 4). The oeients of olumn 2 indiate that job
seekers on the Latin-speaking side are signiantly less likely to nd jobs on their own. The
LBC to this exit state is even larger than the overall gap in olumn 1. In ontrast, unemployed
individuals from the Latin-speaking side are signiantly more likely to take up a job mediated
by the loal PES (olumn 3). The LBC in other exits does not dier systematially and is mostly
insigniant.
Taken together, the results of Table 8 show that observed unemployment dierenes are
unlikely entirely driven by disrimination against Latin-speakers. In that ase, the LBC should
not dier strongly aross exit hannels, as employers should disriminate irrespetive of the
partiular way individuals found jobs. The evidene speaks more in favor of better aess to
searh hannels (= higher eieny in job searh) and/or higher motivation by unemployed
individuals on the German-speaking of the language border.
7.4 Is ulture quantitatively important?
Our empirial analysis has doumented a robust dierene in unemployment durations at the
border between Latin-speaking and German-speaking regions. Job searh lasts about 7 weeks or
about 22 perent longer on the Latin side of the language border than on the German side of the
border. How does this gap ompare to the eets of unemployment insurane on unemployment?
Katz and Meyer (1990) nd that inreasing the potential duration of unemployment benets by
10 weeks inreases unemployment duration by 1 week. Card and Levine (2000) nd somewhat
smaller eets for an exogenous albeit temporary expansion of potential benet duration in New
Jersey. Turning to the benet level, Røed and Zhang (2003) nd that the elastiity of duration
with respet to benets is about 1. This is an upper bound ompared to other studies in the
literature (Atkinson and Miklewright, 1991). We onlude that the Latin gap in unemployment
is equivalent to an inrease in benet duration of somewhat more than one year, or an inrease
in the benet level of at least 22 %. These alulations show that ulture an be a substantial
element of unemployment.
8 Conlusions
This paper studies the extent to whih ultural dierenes in attitudes towards work and unem-
ployment may help to explain regional unemployment dierentials. We fous on the language
border in Switzerland, the Roesti border, where strikingly large dierenes in unemployment
durations are observed. We argue (and provide evidene supporting the view) that the language
border separates two soial groups with strikingly dierent attitudes towards work and unemploy-
ment. We nd that attitudes towards work are important to explain the gap in unemployment
durations. Crossing the language border from the German- to the Latin-speaking side leads to
an inrease in the average duration of unemployment that is of a similar order of magnitude as
the one that is to expeted form a drasti inrease in the generosity of unemployment insurane.
30
We examine other andidate explanations for the observed unemployment gap and onlude
that language-border disontinuities in variables related to these explanations (labor market
onditions, omposition of the unemployment pool, et.) are too small to aount for the observed
gap in unemployment durations. This leads us to onlude that longer job searh durations for
Latin speakers are probably due to ulture rather than markets or institutions.
We onlude that ulture an be as important as sizeable hanges in the inentives via
unemployment insurane. The ulture-driven gap in unemployment duration is equivalent to an
inrease in the potential benet duration of 60 to 70 weeks, or an inrease in the benet level by
22 perentage points.
Our analysis also highlights that eonomi and institutional fores do not automatially lead
to ultural onvergene. The ultural rift we study is solely reated by the fat that the two soial
groups speak dierent languages faing very similar institutions and eonomi opportunities.
This nding is important for sholars who study onvergene among heterogeneous federations
suh as the European Union or the United States. Culture an be an important impediment to
reahing similar views and attitudes regarding the importane of work.
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A Proofs
Proof of Result 1
Part a) We rst onsider a worker not willing to move to the other region. For suh a worker,
we have E−j − f ≤ Uj . Using the equations for the value of unemployment and employment,
we alulate Ej −Uj = (w− b+ zj + γs
2
j/2)/(r + δ + sjλπ). Combining this with the rst order
ondition γsj = λπ(Ej − Uj) yields a quadrati equation in sj . The solution is
sj(γ) = −
r + δ
λπ
+
√(
r + δ
λπ
)2
+
2 (w − b+ zj)
γ
,
from whih Results 1a) diretly follows.
Now onsider a workers who is willing to move. For suh a worker, E−j − f > Uj and
Wj−Uj = πEj+(1− π) (E−j − f)−Uj . Plugging the γsj = λ(Wj−Uj) into the value equations
for unemployment and unemployment we an write Uj = (b + γs
2
j/2 − zj)/r, and Ej =
w/ (r + δ) + (b + γs2j/2 − zj)δ/(r(r + δ)). We substitute these expression into the rst order
ondition γsj = λ(πEj + (1− π) (E−j − f)− Uj), whih yields after some transformations
γsj = λ

w + δr b
r + δ
+ π

 δ
r + δ
γ
s2j
2 − zj
r

+ (1− π)

 δ
r + δ
γ
s2
−j
2 − z−j
r
− f

− λ

b+ γ s2j2 − zj
r



 .
This yields a system of two quadrati equations in sj and s−j . Taking derivatives w.r.t. γ, zj
and z−j , it is straightforward (though somewhat tedious) to show that
∂sj
∂γ
< 0,
∂sj
∂zj
> 0, and
∂sj
∂z−j
< 0.
(Detailed derivations are available on request). This ompletes part a) of the proof.
Part b) We rst need to show that γsj(γ) inreases in γ (i.e. the gains when moving from
unemployment to employment are higher for high-γ workers. For workers not willing to move, we
see this immediately from applying the above equation for sj(γ). For workers not willing to move,
the above system an be rewritten as a system of two quadrati equations in Q(γ) ≡ γsj(γ).
Taking derivatives of the system with respet to γ, shows that γsj(γ) inreases in γ also for
movers.
Denote by γˆj the type who is indierent  when oered a job in region −j  between staying
unemployed in region j and taking up employment in region −j. We onsider the ase zL < zG
whih means so that unemployment is less painful in region L. This implies that WL − UL >
WG − UG, i.e. the gain of moving to the other region is smaller for a searher in L than for a
searher in G. Sine Wj −Uj inreases in γ, the ritial type γˆL > γˆG who is indierent between
moving and staying. This means that  when oered a job from the other region  a searher
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with γ ∈ (γˆL, γˆG) is willing to move when he is urrently in region G, but will deline the oer
when urrently being in region L. γˆL and γˆG solve
sL(γˆL) · γˆL =
r + 2 (1− π) δ
r + (2− π) δ
· λπx+
πδ
r + (2− π)δ
· sG(γˆL) · γˆL
sG(γˆG) · γˆG =
r
r + δ
λπx+
δ
r + δ
· sL(γˆG) · γˆG.
Notie the asymmetry in the solutions for γˆL and γˆG. Type γˆL is indierent when searhing in
L but willling to move when searhing in G. Type γˆG is indierent when searhing in G but
not willling to move when searhing in L. In the speial ase when zG = zL = z
∗
, we have
γˆG = γˆL = γˆ
∗
, whih solves s(γ∗) · γ∗ = λπx.
Regional distribution of type-2 workers
Denote by uij the steady-state unemployment rate of type i in region j. The unemployment
inow of a type-i workers in region j is δ(1 − uij), while the outow is λπs0ju0j for type-0
workers and λs1ju1j for type-1 workers. In steady state, where in- and outow are equally large,
the unemployment rate is u0j = δ/(δ+πλs0j) for type-0 workers and u1j = δ/(δ+λs1j) for type-1
workers. In steady state, only type-2 workers are mobile. Type-0 worker remain in their region
of birth, while type-1 workers end up in region L. Denoting by φ the steady-state share of type-2
workers eventually ending up in region L, there are u2Lφ [f2L + f2G] and u2G(1− φ) [f2L + f2G]
unemployed workers of type 2 in region L and G, respetively. The orresponding mobility rates
depend on job oer arrivals from the other region, whih are λs1L(1 − π) and λs1G(1 − π),
respetively. Setting regional in- and outows equal, we get
1−φ
φ
= s1L(δ+s1Gλ)
s1G(δ+s1Lλ)
. From Result 1a),
we have s1L < s1G. It follows that φ > 1/2. This means the majority of mobile workers lives in
region L.
Proof of Result 2
Part a) Follows from the result that, in steady state, only type 2 workers move. By assumption,
we have f2L > f2G whih establishes the laim.
Part b) Note rst that the expeted duration of unemployment is (πλs)−1 for stayers and
(λs)−1 for movers. We alulate djj′ as the weighted average of expeted durations of the
various types (with the fration of types in the unemployment pool of the respetive jj′ group
as weights). This yields average unemployment durations
dLL = η
0
LL ·
1
λπs0L
+ η1LL ·
1
λπs1L
+ η2LL ·
1
λs2L
dLG =
1
λs2G
dGG = η
0
GG ·
1
λπs0G
+ η2GG ·
1
λs2G
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dGL = η
1
GL ·
1
λπs1L
+ η2GL ·
1
λs2L
where ηijj′ denotes the relevant weights. (For instane, η
1
LG is the share of type-1 workers among
unemployed worker speaking language G and searhing in region L; and so on). The weights are
given by:
 η0GG =
f0Gu0G
f0Gu0G+(1−φ)f2Gu2G
, η1GG = 0, and η
2
GG =
(1−φ)f2Gu2G
f0Gu0G+(1−φ)f2Gu2G
;
 η0GL = 0, η
1
GL =
f1Gu1L
f1Gu1L+φf2Gu2L
, and η2GL =
φf2Gu2L
f1Gu1L+φf2Gu2L
;
 η0LL =
f0Lu0L
f0Lu0L+f1Lu1L+φf2Lu2L
, η1LL =
f1Lu1L
f0Lu0L+f1Lu1L+φf2Lu2L
, and η2LL =
φf2Lu2L
f0Lu0L+f1Lu1L+φf2Lu2L
;
 η0LG = η
1
LG = 0 and η
2
LG = 1.
Under the assumptions on regional dierenes we have siG > siL. As f2G → 0, only type 0 is
remaining in the GG pool, hene this group has the shortest possible duration. When zG ≫ zL,
type-2 workers in region G searh harder than type-1 workers in region L, hene dLG < djL
(with j = L,G). As f0L → 0 and f2G → 0, the GL pool onsist of type-1 workers only, while
the LL pool beomes a mixture of type-1 and type-2 workers, hene dGL < dLL. In sum, we get
dGG < dLG < dGL < dLL.
B Supplementary Empirial Results
Table A.1 provides additional measures of labor demand.
Table A.1: Summary statistis: Labor demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Dierene Dierene at border
All Bilingual antons
No. of work plaes/population (·
1
100
) 8.07 8.39 7.90 .49*** .42 .37
Log no. of work plaes 6.05 5.41 6.39 -.97*** -.50 -.48
% new jobs .05 .06 .04 .02*** .02 .01
% new rms -.00 -.02 .00 -.02*** -.03** -.03**
Vaanies per employed .13 .15 .12 .03*** .01 -.01
Log median wage 3.51 3.45 3.54 -.08*** -.03 -.04
Notes: Latin = majority in ommunity speaks Frenh, Italian or Romansh. Dierene at the border
is estimated using linear speiations. Soure: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistial Oe (FSO), CH-2010 Neuhatel. Distanes from searh.h.
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